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  Hon. A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Judge, United States*
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 09-2243
            
MARY BETH HARSHBARGER,
                                             Appellant
v.
MICHAEL REGAN, United States Marshal for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania; ERIC HOLDER, Attorney General
of the United States; SUSAN TORRES, Attorney Advisor,
Office of the Legal Advisor, United States Department of State;
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, Secretary of State of the
United States
            
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-09-cv-00587)
District Judge: Hon. Thomas I. Vanaskie
            
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 8, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, ROTH and TASHIMA , Circuit Judges*
(Filed: March 29, 2010)
            
Paul P. Ackourey
Scranton, PA 18503
Attorney for Appellant
  The Magistrate Judge had jurisdiction over the1
government’s extradition request pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184, and
the District Court had jurisdiction over this habeas petition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 2253.
2
Dennis C. Pfannenschmidt
United States Attorney
Christian A. Fisanick
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Chief of the Criminal Division
Scranton, PA 18501
Attorneys for Appellees
OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Canada seeks extradition of Mary Beth Harshbarger
(“Ms. Harshbarger”) for causing the death of her husband in the
Canadian wilderness.  After a Magistrate Judge found that she
was extraditable, Ms. Harshbarger filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, which the District Court denied.  She appeals.1
I.
In 2006, Ms. Harshbarger traveled from Pennsylvania to
Canada for a week-long hunting trip with her husband, Mark
Harshbarger, and their two young children.  While hunting one
evening, Ms. Harshbarger waited in a pickup truck with the
children while her husband walked in the brush with a Canadian
hunting guide in search of moose.  Ms. Harshbarger was to stay
with the truck and if a moose or bear presented itself, she was to
shoot it.  When Mark Harshbarger was walking back to the truck
and 200 feet away, Ms. Harshbarger shot him with a rifle, killing
him.  Ms. Harshbarger asserts that she mistakenly took her
  The relevant provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada2
provide:
86.(1) Careless use of firearm, etc.–Every person
commits an offence who, without lawful excuse,
uses, carries, handles, ships, transports or stores a
firearm, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a
prohibited device or any ammunition or prohibited
ammunition in a careless manner or without
reasonable precautions for the safety of other
persons.
. . .
219.(1) Criminal negligence–Every one is criminally
negligent who (a) in doing anything, or (b) in
omitting to do anything that it is his duty to do,
shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives and
safety of others.
. . .
220. Causing death by criminal negligence–Every
person who by criminal negligence causes death to
another person is guilty of an indictable offence and
liable (a) where a firearm is used in the commission
of the offence, to imprisonment for life and to a
minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of
four years; (b) in any other case, to imprisonment for
life.
Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 86, 219, 220 (1985).
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husband for a bear emerging from the brush.
On April 20, 2008, Canadian authorities charged Ms.
Harshbarger with criminal negligence causing death and
carelessly using a firearm in violation of the Criminal Code of
Canada.   The Canadian government requested extradition.  On2
4February 13, 2009, a Magistrate Judge held an evidentiary
hearing during which the Government introduced the affidavits
of Canadian law enforcement officers.  Based upon those
affidavits, the Magistrate Judge found probable cause to believe
that Ms. Harshbarger committed the relevant crime and therefore
issued a certificate of extraditability.  The Magistrate Judge’s
findings were:
1.  The fact that the defendant was aware
her husband was in the bush at the time she took
the fatal shot;
2.  The defendant’s admission to the
Canadian authorities that she “should not have
fired the shot;”
3.  Statements by Canadian investigators to
the effect that they would not have taken the fatal
shot under all the attendant circumstances;
4.  The fact that she took the fatal shot after
sunset, notwithstanding the fact that shooting at
that time was not, in itself, a violation of law or
negligence per se;
5.  The fact that her husband, with whom
she was traveling, was not wearing orange hunting
clothes;
6.  The fact that any number of Canadian
investigators reenacting the alleged crime saw an
ambiguous black mass, from which one might
fairly infer that the defendant took her shot
notwithstanding that the identity of what she saw
was ambiguous even as to her;
7.  The fact that despite defendant’s claims
that she saw or thought she saw a bear, no bear
tracks were found by the Canadian investigator on
the scene, although human footprints were visible
  We review the District Court’s finding of probable cause3
de novo and its factual findings for clear error.  United States v.
Harple, 202 F.3d 194, 196 (3d Cir. 1999).
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on the ground; and
8.  The fact that the defendant
was–apparently–a competent, if not excellent, shot
even at a distance, who had, in fact, killed a
caribou during the course of the same hunting trip,
from which one might reasonably infer that she
knew the consequences of firing her gun could be
fatal to a human being.
App. at 21-22.
Before Ms. Harshbarger was to be extradited to Canada,
she filed a habeas corpus petition in the District Court that
challenged, inter alia, the Magistrate Judge’s reliance on the
affidavits as hearsay evidence, which she argued was insufficient
to support a finding of probable cause under the applicable
extradition treaty.  The District Court denied the petition.  Our
review is plenary.  United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1296
n.10 (3d Cir. 1991).3
II.
“Extradition is an executive rather than a judicial
function.”  Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citing Sidali v. INS, 107 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1997)). Thus,
courts conduct “only a limited inquiry” to determine whether
probable cause supports the charges.  Id.
Once an extradition order has issued, “[a]n individual
challenging a court’s extradition order may not appeal directly,
because the order does not constitute a final decision under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, but may petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”  Id.
(citing Sidali, 107 F.3d at 195).  “On habeas, a reviewing court
may consider only ‘whether the magistrate [judge] had
6jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and,
by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence
warranting the finding [of probable cause].’”  Id. (quoting Sidali,
107 F.3d at 195).  In determining whether there was evidence
“warranting the finding [of probable cause],” id., properly
authenticated “[d]epositions, warrants, or other papers . . .
offered in evidence upon the hearing of any extradition case
shall be received and admitted as evidence [at the] hearing. . . .” 
18 U.S.C. § 3190 (2009).
Evidence that might be excluded at a trial, including
hearsay evidence, is generally admissible at extradition hearings. 
See Hoxha, 465 F.3d at 561 (“A judge [in an extradition
proceeding] may rely on hearsay evidence in considering
whether probable cause is satisfied.” (citing In re A.M., 34 F.3d
153, 161 (3d Cir. 1994))); see also Snider v. Seung Lee, 584 F.3d
193, 204 (4th Cir. 2009); Emami v. U.S. Dist. Court, 834 F.2d
1444, 1451 (9th Cir. 1987).  This is so because “[t]he role of the
magistrate judge in an extradition proceeding is . . . to determine
whether there is competent evidence to justify holding the
accused to await trial, and not to determine whether the evidence
is sufficient to justify a conviction.”  Sidali, 107 F.3d at 199
(quotations and citations omitted).
Ms. Harshbarger argues that the hearsay evidence on
which the Magistrate Judge relied, although admissible under 18
U.S.C. § 3190, was insufficient to establish probable cause under
the extradition treaty between the United States and Canada. 
The extradition treaty provides that
[e]xtradition shall be granted only if the evidence
be found sufficient, according to the laws of the
place where the person sought shall be found,
either to justify his committal for trial if the
offense of which he is accused had been
committed in its territory or to prove that he is the
identical person convicted by the courts of the
requesting State.
Treaty on Extradition, U.S.- Can., art. 10(1), Dec. 3, 1971, 27
7U.S.T. 983 (emphasis added).
Ms. Harshbarger, focusing on the Treaty’s language
referring to the sufficiency of the evidence “according to the
laws of the place where the person sought shall be found,”
argues that she was found in Pennsylvania, and Pennsylvania
excludes hearsay evidence.  The Government responds that 18
U.S.C. § 3190, the federal statute that governs extradition
proceedings, explicitly allows for the use of hearsay at an
extradition hearing.  It notes that in Collins v. Loisel, the
Supreme Court held that hearsay may form the basis for
extradition.  259 U.S. 309, 317 (1922).  Numerous federal cases
since then have also so held.  Judge Friendly, writing for the
court in Shapiro v. Ferrandina, quoted the following language
from Justice Brandeis’ opinion in Collins:
Thus, unsworn statements of absent witnesses may
be acted upon by the committing magistrate,
although they could not have been received by him
under the law of the State on a preliminary
examination.
478 F.2d 894, 902 (2d Cir. 1973) (quoting Collins, 259 U.S. at
317).
The extradition treaty between the United States and
Canada does not contravene the general rule that hearsay
evidence can establish probable cause.  In Bingham v. Bradley,
Canada sought extradition of a habeas petitioner who was found
in Illinois.  241 U.S. 511, 513 (1916).  The extradition treaty
between the United States and Canada at the time provided for
extradition “upon such evidence of criminality as, according to
the laws of the place where the fugitive . . . shall be found,
would justify his apprehension . . . if the crime or offense had
there been committed.”  Id. at 517 (citation omitted).  The statute
governing the admissibility of hearsay evidence at extradition
hearings provided that “any depositions, warrants, or other
papers . . . shall be admissible in evidence at the hearing if
properly authenticated . . . .”  Id. (citing Rev. St. § 5271, as
amended by Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 378, § 5, 22 Stat. 216). 
8The Supreme Court concluded that the hearsay affidavits of
Canadian officials were competent evidence at an extradition
hearing, reasoning that:
It is one of the objects of § 5271 to obviate the
necessity of confronting the accused with the
witnesses against him; and a construction of this
section, or of the treaty, that would require the
demanding government to send its citizens to
another country to institute legal proceedings,
would defeat the whole object of the treaty.
Bingham, 241 U.S. at 517 (citations omitted).
The treaty and statutory provisions in Bingham do not
differ materially from the relevant provisions of the extradition
treaty currently in force between the United States and Canada
and the currently applicable statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3190, which is
the successor statute to § 5271.  See Historical and Statutory
Notes to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3190 (West 2010).  Although the
petitioner in Bingham challenged the competency of the hearsay
evidence rather than its sufficiency, we see no reason to depart
from the Supreme Court’s reasoning when interpreting the treaty
and successor statute in this case.  As the Court stated in
Bingham, it would “defeat the whole object of the treaty” to
require Canadian officials to appear in the United States in order
to offer live testimony at extradition hearings.  241 U.S. at 517.
Ms. Harshbarger relies on In re Sylvester for the contrary
proposition that “a plain reading of the [extradition treaty
between the United States and Canada] indicates that the
sufficiency of the evidence is to be adjudged under Pennsylvania
law . . . .”  No. 05-0490, 2006 WL 6323514, at *3 (M.D. Pa.
Feb. 14, 2006).  The District Court properly found Sylvester to
be “unpersuasive,” App. at 21, because it relies on none of the
above-referenced Supreme Court authorities that have
interpreted similar treaty provisions.  We reject Ms.
Harshbarger’s argument that hearsay evidence was insufficient
to support extradition.
We have examined Ms. Harshbarger’s other arguments
and find them to be without merit.  The Canadian affidavits
provided ample evidence of probable cause for the reasons
expressed by the District Court.  Her equal protection challenge
is curious and unique.  She argues that because the individual
was “unextraditable in Sylvester . . . , the extradition order in
place against her violates her constitutional right to equal
protection.”  Appellant’s Br. at 7.  The equal protection afforded
by the Fifth Amendment (and, by incorporation, the Fourteenth
Amendment) is for federal or state action.  Ms. Harshbarger cites
no legal authority to support her argument that a mere conflict in
legal interpretation by judges in the same court supports an equal
protection challenge, and we have found none.  Ms. Harshbarger
also cites no authority to support her void-for-vagueness
challenge to the Canadian statute.  In any event, the challenge
amounts to a defense that should be heard in the Canadian court,
not here.  See Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 462 (1913).
III.
For the above-stated reasons, we will affirm the judgment
of the District Court.
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